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THE CONCEPT OF "LABOR DISPUTE" IN
STATE UNEMPLOYMENT
INSURANCE LAWS
WILLARD A. LEWIS*
I. DEVELOPMENT OF A DEFINITION
Although labor law practitioners and labor economists generally
associate the term "labor dispute" with federal and state labor relations
acts and with the judicial codes and civil practice laws delimiting the
use of provisional remedies in industrial conflict, the concept of "labor
dispute" leads a separate life under the fifty-two unemployment insur-
ance laws.' The jurisprudence that has evolved from these laws is
most prominently identified with the labor dispute disqualification
provisions found, in one form or another, in each of the laws providing
for unemployment compensation' Given the present federal-state em-
ployment security system, the growth of multi-unit, statewide, and
multi-employer collective bargaining, the changing technology of the
plant and the trend toward more sophisticated state amendments, it is
likely that litigation of unemployment compensation claims arising out
of labor dispute situations will continue to increase.
The statutory framework for the federal-state system has evolved
from the Social Security Act of 1935.' The state employment security
laws were enacted as remedial measures in response to the federal act,'
and provide for the payment of benefits to totally or partially unem-
ployed individuals who satisfy the eligibility requirements and have
not been disqualified for other reasons. One universal ground for deny-
ing or suspending benefits claimed by an unemployed person is that the
unemployment has been caused by a labor dispute. This reason for
ineligibility emphasizes the voluntary character of unemployment
resulting from a strike, in contrast to the design of the law to compen-
sate only for involuntary unemployment. Two other factors are (1) that
government must be neutral in labor disputes and not favor either party
* A.B., New York University, 1934; LL.B., New York University, 1939; AM.,
Columbia University, 1950; Ph.D., New York University, 1961; Member, New York Bar;
Management and Industrial Relations Professor, New York University; Research Associ-
ate, W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. The research for this article has
been supported by a grant from the Office of Research, Schools of Business, New York
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1 See Hughes, Principles Underlying Labor Dispute Disqualification 8-21 (Federal
Security Agency 1946).
2 US. Bureau of Employment Security, Manpower Administration, Dep't of Labor,
BES No. U-141, Comparison of State Unemployment Insurance Laws § 455, at E16-18
(1966). See id. at ET-13, -14 (Eligibility Table 5).
3 Ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
4 The one exception to this is Wisconsin, whose unemployment security law was
enacted in 1931, before the federal act.
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by "financing" strikers, and (2) that benefit payments disbursed out
of funds accumulated through employer contributions would constitute,
in effect, an employer "subsidization" of the strike. Lack of work due
to labor disputes is not thought to be among the impersonal "cyclical,
seasonal, technological, and casual unemployment" forces against which
the legislatures have sought to ensure. Finally, it has been feared that
compensation in labor disputes would undermine the actuarial sound-
ness of the system.
Despite the states' general agreement on the labor dispute dis-
qualification, there is a great lack of uniformity among the various
statutory provisions, limitations, and requirements.' For example, an
important distinction exists between the "stoppage-of-work" jurisdic-
tions and jurisdictions where the wording of the disqualification provi-
sion turns solely upon the existence or the "active progress" of a labor
dispute.' More than thirty-one states follow a federally proposed
formula and disqualify claimants if their unemployment has been
caused by a "stoppage of work," which in turn has been caused by a
labor dispute.8 All state unemployment compensation laws, however,
do have one common concern: the concept of "labor dispute." To deny
benefits to a claimant under a labor dispute disqualification, it must be
found that during the time for which the claimant seeks to recover
benefits, there was either a labor dispute, or a labor dispute-caused
stoppage of work, which brought about the unemployment. Examina-
tion of the fifty-two unemployment insurance laws discloses that, with
the exception of Alabama and Minnesota, the terms "labor dispute"
and "stoppage of work" appear with no express definition. It has been
left to the courts to develop the applicable meanings. Clearly, the phrase
"stoppage of work" has acquired a judicial interpretation which sets it
apart from the ordinary meaning given these words in labor relations
parlance a"Labor dispute," on the other hand, has been given its
common meaning as codified into labor relations statutes. Moreover, the
concept of "labor dispute" appears in every employment security
statute. Although in some unemployment insurance legislation, the
terms "strike," "trade dispute," or "other industrial controversy"
replace "labor dispute," the last is the generic term, traceable to the
Social Security Act of 1935.
As noted, most states have left the question of what constitutes a
5 Lesser, Labor Disputes and Unemployment Compensation, 55 Yale L.J. 167, 176-77
(1945).
6 See generally Lewis, Unemployment Compensation Law in Labor Disputes: Michi-
gan Compared With Seven Selected States 1936-1964 (1964).
See U.S. Bureau of Employment Security, supra note 2.
See generally Lewis, Jobless Pay During Labor Disputes, 22 Management Record 5
(Jan. 1961).
9 Ibid.
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labor dispute under the unemployment compensation laws to their
respective administrative tribunals and, upon judicial review, to their
appellate courts. One state court has said:
We are of the opinion that the legislature deliberately failed
to define that term [labor dispute], for the reason that it
realized that any attempt to define that term might result in a
definition which would not meet conditions arising in the
future."
When appeals have been taken, however, this issue has often been dis-
posed of with a reference to either the federal/state anti-injunction
statutes or the federal/state labor relations acts. The former take the
pattern of the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932;" the latter follow the
language of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935. 12 It is not sur-
prising that when Alabama and Minnesota sought to formulate a
definition of "labor dispute" in their employment security acts, they
adopted language typical of these federal/state laws. Alabama, for
example, added language identical to that which Congress had written
into the original NLRA, and which was carried forward into the Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959: 18
{T]he term "labor dispute" includes any controversy con-
cerning terms, tenure or conditions of employment, or con-
cerning the association or representation of persons in nego-
tiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange
terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether the
disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and
employee.'
Prior to this amendment, the Alabama courts had held that the federal
definition was merely illustrative, not binding?' Minnesota's Employ-
ment Security Law declares that for the purposes of that statute "the
term 'labor dispute' shall have the same definition as provided in the
Minnesota Labor Relations Act." 18
Such statutory definitions, however, are but the recognition,
through the amending process, of the meanings accorded to the term
"labor dispute" as it has evolved at the hands of the judiciary. In an
10 In the Matter of Poison Lumber & Shingle Mills, 19 Wash. 2d 467, 479, 143 P.2d
316, 322 (1943).
11 47 Stat. 70 (1932), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1964).
12 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1964).
13 73 Stat. 519 (1959) (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
14 Ala. Code tit. 26, § 214(A) (1958).
15 See, e.g., Ex parte Pesnell, 240 Ala. 457, 199 So. 726 (1940), cert. denied, 313
U.S. 590 (1941). Tennessee reached a similar conclusion in Block Coal & Coke Co. v.
District 19, UMW, 177 Tenn. 247, 148 S.W.2d 364 (1941).
16 Minn. Stat. § 268.09(1)(6) (1961).
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early opinion which commented on the problem of judicial construction
in the absence of legislative directions, the West Virginia high court
stated:
In the development of the law it has become increasingly
necessary to use appropriate words to define what the law is
on any subject. We say increasingly necessary, because of the
wide use of statutory law to meet the changing needs of the
times. It being necessary to so express thought, the rule has
grown up, having universal application, that in all legislation
it is supposed that the words used by the legislative bodies
are to be given their common, ordinary and accepted mean-
ing. Sometimes the meaning of the words used in the statute
are defined. Unfortunately, the words on which this contro-
versy hinges, "labor dispute," are not defined in the Unem-
ployment Compensation Act, and we must, therefore,
endeavor to determine what the legislature meant when those
words were used."
At this point, the court might have turned to the British prede-
cessors of our unemployment insurance legislation for assistance in
finding a suitable definition, as other courts had done with respect to
the "stoppage of work" concept.' Had such an historical approach
been used, it would have disclosed the following definition:
"Trade dispute" means any dispute between employers and
employees or between employees and employees which is con-
nected with the employment or non-employment or the terms
of employment of any persons, whether employees in the em-
ployment of the employer with whom the dispute arises or
not."
In order to arrive at a meaningful definition of the term, however, the
courts looked instead to the Social Security Act of 1935 20 and its
related Federal Unemployment Insurance Tax Act of 1939." Unlike
the phrase "stoppage of work," which has no archetype in the federal
social security legislation, the term "labor dispute" does occur in these
acts. It appears, for example, in connection with provisions which must
be written into each state or territorial employment security act in
order for that act to qualify for tax offset approval from the Federal
17 Miners in the General Group v. His, 123 W. Va. 637, 644, 17 S.E.2d 810, 814
(1941).
to American Steel Foundries v. Gordon, 404 Ill. 174, 88 N.E.2d 465 (1949); Magner
y. Kinney, 141 Neb. 122, 2 N.W.2d 689 (1942).
19 Unemployment Insurance Act, 1935, Geo. 5, c. 8, § 113(1)(u).
20 Ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified in scattered sections of 42 US.C.).
21 53 Stat. 183 (1939), as amended, 26 U.S.C. § 3301-09 (1964).
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Social Security Board. As the section of the Unemployment Tax Act
regarding suitability of new employment reads:
[C]ompensation shall not be denied . . . to any otherwise
eligible individual for refusing to accept new work under any
of the following conditions:
(A) If the position offered is vacant due directly to a
strike, lockout, or other labor dispute 22 (Em-
phasis added.)
A similar provision occurs in every unemployment compensation
law, separate from the labor dispute disqualification provisions. It
provides the nexus with the federal legislation to which the courts have
turned in search of a more serviceable analysis of "labor dispute" than
the dictionary could provide. The justification for seeking meanings in
the federal statutes is to be found in the congressional policy behind
enactment of the mandatory provisions of the Social Security Act.
These provisions were to ensure that state laws would not defeat the
national labor policy of the New Deal legislation which embodied labor
dispute definitions peculiar to the purposes and goals of collective
bargaining.28
The earlier cases, then, initially defined the labor dispute concept
by referring either to federal legislation in the labor relations and anti-
injunction areas or to similar state enactments. In Miners in the General
Group v. Hix,24 the West Virginia Supreme Court decided that the "no
contract, no work" policy of the United Mine Workers constituted a
labor dispute which would bar unemployment compensation benefits.
It reached this conclusion by applying the definitions of both the
Norris-LaGuardia and National Labor Relations Acts:
We are not bound by the definition of a labor dispute con-
tained in the Federal statutes, but these definitions are at least
persuasive of what should be the definition of such a dispute,
and are not out of line with the general and common accepta-
tion of the meaning of the term. Until a better definition is
found, or there is some substantial reason for finding that
our legislature had in mind a different meaning to be attached
22 68A Stat. 445 (1954), as amended, 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(5) (1964).
23 But see Johnson v. Unemployment Ins. Comm'n, 367 S.W.2d 253, 255 (Ky. 1963),
where the court stated:
The breadth of the definition in the Norris-LaGuardia and the Wagner Acts
was implementary of their fundamental purpose to protect the right of collective
bargaining. It was meant as an umbrella. On the other hand, it is argued, the
disqualification provision of our unemployment compensation law . . . has a
different purpose and calls for a restrictive rather than a broad definition of
the term, in keeping with the spirit of unemployment compensation as distin-
guished from the objectives of the federal legislation relating to labor disputes.
24 Supra note 17.
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thereto, there would seem to be no impropriety in our accept-
ing these existing definitions in the determination of what was
then meant. So far as we know, the Federal statute, under
which our own Unemployment Compensation Act to a certain
extent operates, does not contain a definition of what a labor
dispute is; but it does make provisions, which our statute
closely follows, by which workers are protected against being
deprived of compensation where strikes, lockouts, and other
labor disputes are in existence. At least the sections governing
this situation in both Federal and State statutes are, in effect,
similar, and bring out into bold relief the proposition that in
enacting them, Congress and the legislature had in mind that
there could be a labor dispute aside from either a strike or
lockout.
. . . The legislature using no words of explanation of its
intent, we naturally resort to the generally accepted meaning
of the term "labor dispute." Furthermore, our Unemployment
Compensation Law, being enacted in consequence of, and to
be administered in harmony with, pre-existing Federal legis-
lation on the subject, we are warranted in resorting to general
as well as special Federal enactments in interpreting the
meaning of the terms as used in our statute, which, in our
opinion, plainly cover the difference of opinion between the
mine workers and the operators in the joint conference in
New York.25
This statement represents the attitude of a number of courts, despite
an early argument which charged that it was "unwarrantable that such
statutory definition, obviously given a comprehensive meaning in the
Federal Law seeking to benefit the worker, should be torn from its
original setting and, by judicial interpolation, be read into the Alabama
Act so as to be destructive of the elemental purpose of that Act, i.e. the
relief of unemployment."'
Many courts, although reluctant to adopt outright federal defini-
tions, have not hesitated to refer to their own state statutes, even though
the latter may have been fostered by the former. In Connecticut,
25 Id. at 646-47, 17 S.E.2d at 815-16. See Spielmann v. Industrial Comm'n, 236 Wis.
240, 295 N.W. 1 (1940), for a decision from a non-"stoppage-of-work" jurisdiction.
26 Department of Industrial Relations v. Drummond, 30 Ala. App. 78, 82, 1 So. 2d
395, 399 (1941). See Ex parte Pesnell, supra note 15.
Other states have also considered this question. Washington, for example, has
rejected the influence of the federal acts, Ackerlund v. Employment Security Dep't, 49
Wash. 2d 292, 300 P.2d 1019 (1956). Kentucky and Colorado have made the federal
definitions binding, Johnson v. Unemployment Ins. Comm'n, supra note 23; Sandoval v.
Industrial Comm'n, 110 Colo. 108, 130 P.2d 930 (1942). Iowa has applied the NLRA,
Dallas Fuel Co. v. Horne, 230 Iowa 1148, 300 N.W. 303 (1941).
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Indiana, and Wisconsin, courts have assumed that their legislatures
intended to adopt the definition and construction of "labor dispute"
found in their respective anti-injunction acts." Missouri has been
guided by the definition in its public utility, strike act;" and Hawaii
has adhered to the description of "labor dispute" used in its stevedoring
disputes law of 1955."
There was important early qualification to the appropriation of
labor dispute definitions from other statutes: the other statute must
pre-date the passage of the particular state unemployment compensa-
tion law. In Spielmann v. Industrial Comm'n," the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin refused to adopt the definition of labor dispute which was
used in the Wisconsin Labor Relations Act because "the 1939 definition
could not possibly have been in the mind of the 1931 Legislature."'
However, the court did adopt the definition used in the state anti-
injunction law which had been in force at the time of the enactment of
that state's Unemployment Reserves and. Compensation Act." Conse-
quently, in the Spielmann case, the Wisconsin court found that although
there was.no voluntary withdrawal from work, there was nonetheless a
labor dispute under the broad definition of their anti-injunction statute.
In that case, workers at the Racine plant of an automobile manufac-
turer were picketing to protest management's plan to close the Racine
plant; there, was technically no strike. As a result, unemployed workers
at' the Kenosha, plantof the same company, where there was no picket-
ing or.striking, were denied unemployment compensation benefits.
An interesting development in labor disputes disqualification juris-
prudence in. Wisconsin followed the 1939 amendment to the definition
of "labor dispute" in the anti-injunction act. The amendment intro-
duced a narrower. definition of that term, and a correlative broadening
of the.circumstances in which claimants were entitled to benefits." In
27 See Alvarez v. Administrator, 139 Conn. 327, 93 A.2d 298' (1952); Conte v.
Egan, 135 Conn. 367, 64 A.2d 534 (1949); Adkins v. Employment Security Div., 117
Ind. App. 132, 70 N.E.2d 31 (1946); Spielmann v. Industrial Comm'n, supra note 25.
28 See, e.g., Poggemoeller v. Industrial Comm'n, 371 S.W.2d 488 (Mo. Ct. App. 1963).
29 See, e.g., Inter-Island Resorts, Ltd. v. Akahane, 46 HaWaii 140, 377 P.2d 715
(1962).
39 Supra note 25.
33 Id. at 250, 295 N.W. at 6. As pointed out supra note 4, both the Norris-LaGuardia
and National Labor Relations Acts were enacted before all state imemployment insurance
laws except that of Wisconsin.
32 Wis. Laws Spec. Sess. 1931, ch. 20, § 2, as amended, Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 108.01-26
(1957).
33 Wis. Laws 1939, ch. 25 eliminated the phrase "regardless of whether or not the
disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee." The statute now
reads as follows:
The term "labor dispute" means any controversy between an employer
and the majority of his employees in a collective bargaining unit concerning the
right or process or details of collective bargaining or the designation of.representa-
tives. Any organization with which either the employer or. such majority is
35
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one case, there was a labor dispute between concrete suppliers and their
drivers. As a result, a general contractor was unable to obtain concrete
because he would not buy from non-union suppliers for fear of being
picketed. When the general contractor had to lay off employees because
of this supply shortage, these employees were allowed unemployment
benefits, for the court required "more of a thread than is present here
which connects the employer (in the case of a lockout) or the employee
(in case of a strike) with the controversy."" In Illinois a similar result
was suggested when the court said that "the term 'labor dispute,' as it
appears in the Illinois Anti-Injunction Act ... is narrower [than in the
Norris-LaGuardia Act] in the sense that it has been held to apply only
to those cases where employees have a dispute with their own employer
or to a dispute between groups of employees and employers.'
The United States Supreme Court, however, has rejected the
restrictive construction of a disqualification clause urged by idled
seasonal workers who argued that there must be an existing employment
relationship at the time the controversy between the union and the em-
ployer arises. The Unemployment Compensation Comm'n v. Amon"
decision did not determine whether "labor dispute" must always be
construed as broadly as it is defined in the Norris-LaGuardia and
National Labor Relations Acts. It did hold, however, that a "dispute
there certainly was; and the subject of that dispute consisted of matters
usually contested in labor disputes as that term is normally under-
stood."37 In a footnote, the Court acknowledged the recognition ac-
corded by the Kentucky, Alabama, and Colorado courts, and by the
Alabama Legislature, to the federal labor law definitions." Further-
more, the Court pointed to the mandatory federal language concerning
conditions for refusal of new work when "the position offered is vacant
due directly to a strike, lockout, or other labor dispute," as ground for
favoring a broader meaning,' Relying upon the Aragan case, the New
Jersey Supreme Court went so far as to declare that "the term 'labor
dispute' broadly includes any controversy concerning terms or condi-
tions of employment or arising out of the respective interests of em-
ployer and employee." 40
affiliated may be considered a party to the labor dispute.
Wis. Stat. Ann. 103.62(3) (1957).
34 Kenneth F. Sullivan Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 25 Wis. 211 84, 90, 130 N.W.2d
194, 197 (1964).
35 Local 11 v. Gordon, 396 Ill. 293, 298, 71 N.E.2d 637, 640 (1947).
36 329 U.S. 143 (1946).
37 Id. at 151.
38 Id. at 149-50 n.8.
39 Id. at 150, quoting from the Alaska Employment Security Act, Alaska Stat.
23.20.385(a)(1) (1962).
40 Mortensen v. Board of Review, 21 N.J. 242, 246, 121 A.2d 539, 541 (1956),
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II. LABOR DISPUTES IN THE ABSENCE OF MANIFEST CONFLICT
Strikes, picket lines, lockouts, and controversies over collective
bargaining and contract negotiations have always been the indicia of
labor disputes. Whenever it is alleged that a labor dispute exists in the
absence of this kind of manifest conflict, there are troublesome ques-
tions regarding the interpretation of the underlying nature and purposes
of such concerted action, as well as with the relationship of the parties
involved. In addition, some jurisdictions have eliminated the lockout
and certain other employer conduct from the list of disqualification
factors. These circumstances require further refinement in the deter-
mination of when a labor dispute exists or ceases to exist.
A. "No Contract—No Work"
The problem of how to interpret this phrase in the context of the
unemployment insurance laws first confronted the courts when the
United Mine Workers implemented its "no contract—no work" slogan.
When no new agreement was reached between the union and the mine
operators, all coal mining facilities whose workers had been covered by
the old agreement were closed down at midnight March 31, 1939, and
again in 1941. During these periods, the industry made no effort to
operate the mines.
In the several jurisdictions in which unemployment insurance
claims were adjudicated, the mine workers resorted to a variety of
arguments to avoid disqualification. In an Alabama case, for example,
it was urged that a "labor dispute" exists only where a strike or lock-
out "or some similar show of force or intensity of feeling results." The
state supreme court rejected this argument.' Kentucky and Tennessee
appellate courts both rejected the contention that there can be no labor
dispute in the absence of an existing employer-employee relationship.
The former court applied the federal definitions which declared that
such a dispute existed "regardless of whether the disputants stand in
the proximate relation of employer and employee!" 92 The latter inter-
preted the term as "broad enough to cover not only one presently in
the relationship of employer and employee, but one who has last been
in such relationship although that relationship may have expired.""
In 1940, an intermediate appellate court in Ohio reached a contrary
conclusion," but this view was rejected by the state supreme court in
1946." The expiration of the collective bargaining agreement between
41 Ex parte Pesnell, supra note 15.
42 Barnes v. Hall, 285 Ry. 160, 174, 146 S.W.2d 929, 935 (1940).
48 Block Coal & Coke Co. v. District 19, UMW, supra note 15, at 259, 148 S.W.2d
at 368.
44 United States Coal Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 66 Ohio
App. 329, 32 N.E2d 763 (1940).
48 Baker v. Powhatan Mining Co., 146 Ohio St. 600, 67 N.E.2d 714 (1946).
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the mine operators and the union was not a decisive factor to the
Indiana Supreme Court, and a refusal to work except under new and
different contract terms was held to be a controversy—a strike—in
the ordinary meaning of those words." In Utah, similar union action,
even though notice thereof was given during a lay-off, was held to
result in ineligibility since the "stoppage of work existed because of a
strike."" (Emphasis supplied.) More recently, a Pennsylvania
superior court held that the Marine and Shipbuilding Workers' refusal
to work without a contract, after the expiration of the old collective
bargaining agreement, constituted a strike, and consequently was a
disqualifying labor dispute." Some decisions were strongly supported
by a history of legislative refusal to define the scope of the labor
dispute concept through amendment. Thus, in West Virginia there had
been a continued failure to enact a proposal which would have pro-
vided that the "loss of employment resulting from the expiration of an
existing joint-wage agreement by reason of failure to agree upon a new
joint-wage agreement, and until negotiations for a new joint-wage
agreement are terminated by joint action of both parties or by either
party thereto, shall not constitute a labor dispute.'"
The leading Colorado case of Sandoval v. Industrial Comm'n"
undertook a definitional analysis of "strike" as applied to the "no
contract–no work" fact situation, and of "labor dispute" as defined by
the NLRA. Citing a federal court decision," the Colorado Supreme
Court listed the five indicia of a "strike": (1) a suspended employer-
employee relationship; (2) a demand for some concession, generally
for modification of conditions of labor or rates of pay; (3) a refusal to
return to work with intent to bring about compliance with the demand;
(4) an intention to return to work when compliance is accomplished;
and (5) an intention on the part of the operator to re-employ the same
men or men of a similar class when the demands are acceded to or with-
drawn or otherwise adjusted.'
It is important to emphasize that a strike is characterized by a
suspension, rather than a termination, of the employer-employee rela-
tionship, and, in addition, the employees who leave work must do so
with the intention of returning. Both of these prerequisites were
present in the mine workers' dispute. Although the Colorado court rec-
46 Walter Bledsoe Coal Co. v. Review Bd., 221 Ind. 16, 46 N.E.2d 477 (1943).
41 Employees of Lion Coal Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 100 Utah 207, 111 P.2d
797 (1941).
48 Hogan Unemployment Compensation Case, 169 Pa. Super. 554, 83 A.2d 386 (1951).
48 Miners in the General Group v. Hia, supra note 17, at 656, 17 S.E.2d at 820.
55 Supra note 26.
51 Iron Molders' Union No. 125 v. Allis-Chalmers Co., 166 Fed. 45, 52 (7th Cir.
1908).
52 Supra note 26, at 120, 130 P.2d at 935-36.
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ognized that there may be a labor dispute regardless of whether there is
any employer-employee relationship, lacking that relationship there
could be no strike. The court stated:
[A]n actual employer-employee relationship did not exist
[during the no contract—no work period] ; but neither was
their relationship the same as that of men seeking employment
from and negotiating for terms with operators between which
and them an actual employer-employee relationship had never
existed. As near as the relationship that did exist can be de-
scribed, it was a suspended employer-employee relationship
and recognized by both parties as such."
More generally, "strike" has been defined as an employees' work
stoppage, by common agreement, for the purpose of obtaining or resist-
ing a change in conditions of employment." "Picketing forms no part
of this definition. It is common knowledge that a strike may or may not
be accompanied by the establishment of a picket line. On the other
hand, picketing may exist in the absence of a strike!" 66 Applying these
statements to the mine owners who, under closed shop arrangements,
depend entirely upon union labor for their operations, there certainly
may be a labor dispute without picketing. It is equally certain that
there may be a labor dispute in the absence of an existing collective
bargaining agreement when the union and the employer are unable to
agree on the terms of the contract to be entered into between them.
B. Anticipatory Shutdowns
Another instance in which it is necessary to determine whether a
labor dispute exists in the absence of picketing, overt strike action, or
lockout is in the case where there is an anticipatory shutdown in the
face of threatened employee action, or an anticipatory decrease in
business operations. Such shutdowns, occurring in both stoppage-of-
work and non-stoppage-of-work jurisdictions, have led to decisions
which further reinforce the view that it is not necessary to show that a
strike or a lockout exists in order to establish a disqualifying labor
dispute.
Two leading cases on this subject come from New Jersey. In one
case," a fur processing company being threatened with a strike over
the terms of a new collective bargaining contract stopped taking skins,
which might have spoiled if there were a strike, until the situation was
55 Id. at 119, 130 P.2d at 935.
54 Bilodeau v. Employment Security Comm in, 153 Me. 254, 136 A.2d 522 (1957).
55 Local 11 v. Gordon, supra note 35, at 300, 71 NE.2d at 641.
56 Ablondi v. Board of Review, 8 N.J. Super. 71, 73 A.2d 262 (1950).
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clarified. This, of course, resulted in a curtailment of production and a
simultaneous layoff of employees. In the other case," the Industrial
Union of Marine and Shipbuilding Workers threatened a strike against
the Bethlehem Steel Company unless a new agreement was reached.
The company refused to accept ship repair work on which it was re-
quired to guarantee delivery dates or risk assessment of penalty pay-
ments. Again, employees were laid off for lack of work. In both in-
stances, unemployment compensation benefits were denied, which was
consistent with developing case law sustaining the broad construction
of the term "labor dispute." As in Aragan," there was a "dispute" even
though there was no strike or lockout. Moreover, the New Jersey Leg-
islature had refused to pass amendments substituting the term "strike"
in place of "labor dispute." The state supreme court declared that
"'strike' or 'lockout' ... are merely two of the forms by which a 'labor
dispute' may be manifested!"68
In Alabama, there have been cases where employers extinguished
kiln fires before a strike deadline to prevent excessive losses to ceramic
products, and shut down annealing ovens to protect against damage
during the threat of strike. 80 Under Pennsylvania law, if an employer
curtails production and in good faith reduces employment in order to
protect his plant against an impending walk-out, that constitutes an
industrial dispute and the resulting unemployment is not compensable."
It has been ingeniously argued that the unemployment was due to
the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement and not to the
differences between the employer and the labor organization," or that
all that transpired between the parties were "negotiations" as such."
The lack of the new contract, however, was itself due to the labor dis-
pute, and the reason for the negotiations was the difference over terms
of employment. As one court put it: "the labor dispute was the contro-
versy and disagreement which took place [and it] ... was in existence
before the strike and the lockout took place . . . . The strike and the
lockout ... were the tools by which [the union] ... and the employers
sought to prevail in the dispute?'"
52 Mortensen v. Board of Review, supra note 40.
58 Supra note 36.
59 Mortensen v. Board of Review, supra note 40, at 246, 121 A.2d at 541.
60 Department of Industrial Relations v. Walker, 268 Ala. 507, 109 So. 2d 135
(1959); Department of Industrial Relations v. Savage, 38 Ala. App. 277, 82 So. 2d 435
(1955).
61 Mosko v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 199 Pa. Super. 73, 184
A.2d 395 (1962).
62 Block Coal & Coke Co. v. District 19, UMW, 177 Tenn. 247, 257-58, 148 S.W.2d
364, 368.
83 Poggemoeller v. Industrial Comm'n, supra note 28, at 503.
64 Id. at 501.
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C. Other Rulings
The question of whether or not a labor dispute exists without a
strike, picket line, or lockout has resulted in a number of interesting
rulings allowing recovery of benefits. The mere filing of a grievance by
a union when an employer undertook unilateral changes in rates of pay
did not, of itself, constitute a labor dispute." Nor was there a disquali-
fying dispute when garment workers were laid off fot lack of work
during a period when the company and the union were negotiating
piece-work rate adjustments." A New York court found that the nego-
tiations with the garment workers was evidence of peaceful collective
bargaining with only an incidental stoppage of work, and that "is not
what the Legislature meant by 'strike, lockout or other industrial con-
troversy' which, read together, must open to the construction that the
`other industrial controversy' intended was something in the nature of
a strike or lockout."" The same principle of "peaceful bargaining" was
applied in favor of claimants laid off during a negotiating period un-
marked by "act or incident?" as opposed to a situation where picket-
ing, employer-employee hostility, and use of the National Labor Rela-
tions Board were involved." When a Connecticut employer voluntarily
shut down during labor negotiations in order to improve his bargaining
position, it was held to be a "lockout" only in the generic sense of that
concept, and not a disqualifying "labor dispute."' 0 The consequent
unemployment, therefore, was caused not by the underlying labor dis-
pute, but rather by a lockout occurring in the course of that dispute. On
the other band, a layoff resulting from a union-management agreement
to abandon staggered work shifts and to reduce the number of shifts
was held attributable to a continuing labor dispute, despite the initial
mutual resolution of the controversy.' More particularly, the union
had struck the employer, alleging that the operation of the coal tipple
by three staggered work shifts was a violation of the collective bar-
gaining contract. Thereafter, the company accepted the union demands,
began to operate in two shifts instead of three, and discontinued the
staggered work force. Because the company could not process as much
coal under this arrangement, it was necessary to reduce the number of
workers in the mine. The laid-off employees sought unemployment com-
pensation benefits. The Kentucky Court of Appeals held that those who
65 Bartlett v. Administrator, 142 Conn. 497, 115 A.2d 671 (1955).
66 In the Matter of Cohen, 283 App. Div. 143, 126 N.Y.S.2d 648 (1953).
67 Id. at 144-45, 126 N.YS.2d at 650.
68 In the Matter of Keane, 2 App. Div. 2d 148, 151, 153 N.YS.2d 290, 293 (1956),
aff'd, 6 N.Y.2d 910, 161 NE 2d 17, 190 N.Y.S.2d 714 (1959).
69 In the Matter of Klein, 15 App. Div. 2d 201, 222 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1961), aff'd, 12
N.Y.2d 678, 185 N.E.2d 909, 233 N.Y.S.2d 471 (1962).
70 Brecht' v. Rapid Transit Co., 20 Conn. Supp. 209, 131 A.2d 211 (1957).
71 Ward v. Barnes, 266 S.W.2d 338 (Ky. 1954).
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lost their jobs as a result of this change in operations were not entitled
to benefits, because their unemployment was, in the language of the
statute, caused by "a strike or other [good faith] labor dispute . . . in
active progress...." The workers were returned to their jobs when the
union settled the dispute by withdrawing its opposition to the com-
pany's former practice. The court, however, viewed the period between
layoff and reinstatement as "a mere truce or armistice in the labor
dispute?'"
In Florida, another state with a labor-dispute-in-active-progress
provision, there was an unusual case in which a claimant's disqualifica-
tion was ruled to continue beyond the termination of the strike and
throughout the period during which an unfair labor practice proceeding
was pending before the NLRB." The Indiana Appellate Court, when
faced with a similar situation, reached a different result." After a wild-
cat strike by its employees, the company involved decided not to resume
operations. When the employer refused to yield to union demands to
reopen the plant, the union filed an unfair labor practice charge, but did
not resort to a strike. In spite of the lockout by the employer, the court,
in holding that there was no disqualifying labor dispute, said: "the
existence of differences between labor and management does not ipso
facto constitute a labor dispute causing a stoppage of work.'
In one very difficult case," employees returned from a vacation to
learn that their working conditions and the standards by which they
were to be paid had been substantially changed. Evidence indicated
that the work could not be performed under the rigorous new condi-
tions. It was found that this did not constitute a "dispute," because the
employees were ready and willing to work. Since they were unable to
comply with the new conditions, however, they were involuntarily un-
employed.
Comparing some of the New York decisions" with others," one
can see the distinction between unemployment incidental to the normal
period of collective bargaining and unemployment caused by economic
warfare following an impasse. This distinction has achieved the status
of doctrine in some jurisdictions. In New York, for example, the Unem-
ployment Insurance Appeals Board has deliberately taken this ap-
72 Id. at 339. See Johnson v. Unemployment Ins. Comm'n, 367 S.W.2d 253, 256
(Ky. 1963), where the court stated that "if a dispute is considered to be still in active
progress during a voluntary truce, surely it must be so during an involuntary one."
73 Meyer v. Industrial Comm'n, 117 So. 2d 216 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
74 Ross v. Board of Review, 172 N.E.2d 442 (Ind. CL App. 1961).
75 Id. at 448.
76 Department of Industrial Relations v. Stone, 53 So. 2d 859 (Ala. CL App. 1951).
77 E.g., In the Matter of Cohen, supra note 66; In the Matter of Keane, supra note
68.
78 E.g., In the Matter of Klein, supra note 69.
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proach to avoid enlargement of the "industrial controversy" concept.
The Board thereby seeks to effectuate that state's policy of "encourag-
ing collective bargaining and peaceful negotiations of written agree-
ments." 7° The distinction has also been recognized in collective labor
agreements themselves." In order to attempt to insulate employees
from the labor dispute disqualification, it has sometimes been provided
in these agreements that employees can discontinue working while the
employer and the union are adjusting piece rates. Both Massachusetts
and Minnesota have amended their respective labor dispute disqualifi-
cation provisions to avoid a judicial extension of those provisions to
periods of unemployment during labor-management bargaining. The
Massachusetts amendment states that
nothing in this subsection shall be construed so as to deny
benefits to an otherwise eligible individual (1) who becomes
involuntarily unemployed during the period of the negotiation
of a collective bargaining contract, in which case the indi-
vidual shall receive benefits for the period of his unemploy-
ment but in no event beyond the date of the commencement
of a strike or lockout... 81
Minnesota provides that if an employee is otherwise eligible, benefits
shall not be denied "because of a lockout or . . . dismissal during the
period of negotiation in any labor dispute and prior to the commence-
ment of a strike " 82
III. STRIKE ACTION AND PICKETING—THE PURPOSE TEST
Just as there may be a labor dispute in the absence of a strike,
lockout, or picket line, the presence of such circumstances does not,
of itself, guarantee the finding of a labor dispute. Although it has been
stated that, "under any definition, a labor dispute includes a strike,""
such concerted action may be put to the "purpose test," for, "every
`labor objective' is not a technical 'labor dispute.'"" The trend, how-
ever, has been toward a broad construction. Clearly, for instance,
picketing by a union in furtherance of its demand for recognition as a
bargaining agent constitutes a disqualifying controversy." Picketing
to obtain reinstatement of a fellow employee who had been the subject
79 Colin, The Law of Unemployment Insurance in New York 229 (1950).
80 Id. at 230.
81 Mass. Laws 1959, ch. 554, § 25(b), Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 151A, § 25(b)
(Supp. 1965).
82 Minn. Stat. § 268.09(1)(6) (1961).
83 Local 11 v. Gordon, 396 Ill. 293, 299, 71 N.E.2d 637, 640 (1947).
84 Badgett v. Department of Industrial Relations, 243 Ala. 538, 542, 10 So. 2d 880,
883 (1942).
85 See Nobes v. Unemployment Compensation Comm'n, 313 Mich. 472, 21 N.W.2d
820 (1946).
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of a disciplinary layoff was held to constitute a labor dispute despite the
"no suspension of work" clause in the union's contract;" the court
stated that "concerted activities in walking off the job and in picketing
the plant in protest over the suspension of a fellow union member and
in thus supporting him in connection with the treatment accorded him
seems to be generally recognized as a labor dispute."" In one case, a
strike was found to be a labor dispute even though there was no contro-
versy between the employer and the employees, qua employees.88 In
another case, workmen picketed an Air Force base because the Govern-
ment had implemented an economy order by replacing several steam-
fitters with civil service employees. The Appeal Board held that this
was not an "industrial controversy" because it amounted to a dispute
between the union and the Air Force. This was reversed. The New York
court read the language of the dispute disqualification clause broadly
enough to encompass this situation, which was viewed as a dispute be-
tween the union and two heating contract employers." Even when the
union involved is engaged in a secondary boycott and does not represent
any of the employees, New York has suspended benefits." Another
dispute which comes within the disqualification clause occurs when a
union protests the use of non-union supervisory personnel, contrary to
the collective agreement, on maintenance jobs."
Claimants have argued that walkouts designed to obtain recovery
of past-due pay claims rather than future wages were not within the
term "labor dispute." These arguments have not been recognized. In
one case, involving a strike over a demand for approximately $6,000 in
back wages, the appellate court ruled that
conceding for the sake of argument that the claimants in this
case stopped work because they had not been paid their past-
due wages, that fact does not necessarily preclude a finding
that a labor dispute existed.... The fact that the purpose of
the walkout may have been the collection of the past-due
wages makes it no less a labor dispute. . . . The means em-
ployed were identical with those ordinarily used to obtain a
closed shop, better wages, shorter hours or better working
conditions."
86 Milne Chair Co. v. Hake, 190 Tenn. 395, 230 S.W.2d 393 (1950).
87 Id. at 400, 230 S.W.2d at 395, citing Carter Carburetor Corp. v. NLRB, 140 F.2d
714, 718 (8th Cir. 1944).
88 In the Matter of Poison Lumber & Shingle Mills, 19 Wash. 2d 467, 143 P.2d 316
(1943).
89 In the Matter of Sprague, 4 App. Div. 2d 911, 167 N.Y.S.2d 127 (1957).
oe In the Matter of Gilmartin, 10 N.Y.2d 16, 176 N.E.2d 51, 217 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1961).
91 See Amory Worsted Mills, Inc. v. Riley, 96 N.H. 162, 71 A.2d 788 (1950).
92 Deshler Broom Factory v. Kinney, 140 Neb. 889, 892-93, 2 N.W.2d 332, 334
(1942).
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A similar result was reached when organized employees failed to report
for work in an attempt to recover back vacation pay allegedly owed
them. The court pointed out, however, that
it is undoubtedly true that where, because of the employer's
refusal or inability to pay past-due wages, an employee or all
employees quit with the intention of seeking other employ-
ment, there is no strike or labor dispute within the meaning
of the act."
Similarly, strikes designed to force employers to comply with their
contractual obligations to pay into health and welfare funds have been
found to be within the labor dispute disqualification."
On the other hand, in deciding if a labor dispute exists, it is im-
material whether the concerted conduct of the employees was in viola-
tion of their own contract with the employer. The purpose of the walk-
out (or lockout) is examined in terms of the general objectives sought
after in labor disputes—not in terms of its justification or lack of justi-
fication. "[T]he unemployment compensation act is not designed to be
used as an instrument with which to force compliance with other legal
precepts."'" The concept of state neutrality in unemployment compen-
sation proceedings assures that industrial controversies are not prevented
from being considered labor disputes simply because one of the parties
may be breaching a collective bargaining agreement," unless the
statute provides otherwise." A union walkout to protest an employer's
refusal to sign a temporary renewal contract pursuant to the order of
the War Labor Board was nonetheless a disqualifying labor dispute,"
as was a suspension of work to force the employer to comply with the
retroactive wage directive of that same Board."
IV. INTRA-UNION DISPUTES, RIVAL UNION DISPUTES, AND
JURISDICTIONAL STRIKES
Intra-union and interunion differences which have led to employee
collective action against the employer, and to subsequent unemploy-
ment, have presented difficult problems to both the administrative
93 Local 11 v. Gordon, supra note 83, at 301, 71 N.E.2d at 641.
94 E.g., Glen Alden Corp. v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 189 Pa.
Super. 286, 150 A.2d 591 (1959).
95 T. R. Miller Mill Co. v. Johns, 261 Ala. 615, 619, 75 So. 2d 675, 678 (1954).
Accord, In the Matter of Heitzenrater, 22 App. Div. 2d 542, 256 N.Y.S.2d 1000 (1965).
See Burleson Unemployment Compensation Case, 173 Pa. Super. 527, 98 A.2d
762 (1953).
97 Arizona, Arkansas, and New Hampshire prevent disqualification when an em-
ployer breaches the collective bargaining agreement in a labor dispute.
98 Fash v. Gordon, 398 III. 210, 75 N.E.2d 294 (1947).
ga Cassell Unemployment Compensation Case, 167 Pa. Super. 440, 74 A.2d 809
(1950).
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agencies and the courts. As a general rule, "labor dispute" has been
construed to include situations in which the employer appears to be an
innocent or neutral party. For example, when a steelworkers' local
struck an employer as part of a dispute with the international union
and its master collective agreement which froze all wage scales, a
Pennsylvania court ruled the resulting unemployment noncompen-
sable!' The union's constitution provided that exclusive representa-
tion of the company's employees rested in both the local and the inter-
national. If the master agreement was binding on the local, the local was
striking in violation of that agreement; if the master agreement was
not validly extended, or had been terminated by action of the local,
the work stoppage was nonetheless a strike. Conversely, after another
local union had negotiated a piece-work rate settlement with its em-
ployer, a walkout ordered by the international union was also declared
to be a labor dispute. 10' The claimants had urged that the dispute was
not between the company and its employees, but rather between the
local and the parent union. The court disagreed and emphasized that to
have a labor dispute, the controversy need only arise "out of the
respective interests of employer and employee, regardless of whether
or not the disputants [the International and the employer] stand in the
proximate relation of employer and employee."'"
In a similar fact situation, a labor dispute was held to exist when
employee-members of a local union at one oil company plant refused to
cross a picket line at their plant which was manned by "stranger
pickets," employees from another of the company's plants who were
members of a different local, but of the same international.'" At the
time, there was an industry-wide dispute in progress between the oil
companies and the international union, of which the local negotiations
were a part.
In an unusual case, a mineworkers' local union struck in protest
against a company's checkoff of union dues and assessments at a rate
that had been accepted by the district and international unions. The
miners, covered by a closed shop contract with an automatic dues de-
duction clause, were, in effect, striking against the increased contribu-
tions that had been adopted by their own union. Commenting that the
company derived no personal gain from the dispute, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, in Miller v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Re-
vieta, 1°4 found that there was an "industrial dispute" and said that
the Unemployment Compensation Law . . . does not define
too Burleson Unemployment Compensation Case supra note 96.
nu Alvarez v. Administrator, 139 Conn. 327, 93 A.2d 298 (1952).
102 1th at 334, 93 A.2d at 302.
103 Local 222, Oil Workers Int'l Union v. Gordon, 406 Ill. 145, 92 N.E.2d 739 (1950).
104 152 Pa. Super. 315, 31 A.2d 740 (1943).
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an "industrial dispute"; nor are we called upon here to give
the term an exact definition. . . . It may be between the em-
ployees and their Union or bargaining agency, provided it
involves the employer and affects the terms or conditions of
employment.'" (Emphasis added.)
This principle was applied in subsequent years with various results.
In one instance, the membership of an independent union which was
the certified bargaining agent for certain employees voted to affiliate
with the Congress of Industrial Organizations. Some of the members,
however, formed a union associated with the American Federation of
Labor and struck to compel the employer to recognize the latter union.
Idled workers were granted compensation benefits when the court found
that no labor dispute existed because the employer was not involved.'"
Later, the Miller principle was declared not to be "an invariable or
infallible test in all circumstances . . . in determining whether a work
stoppage is from a labor dispute." 1°7 But a labor dispute was found
to exist when there was a controversy between the CIO and an AFL
affiliate. Each was seeking recognition as the exclusive bargaining agent
for a group of employees. The court held that such a dispute involved
the interests of both the employer and all employees. However, it was
the employer's refusal to recognize one of the unions except upon
NLRB certification that, "in itself, stamped the contest a labor
dispute."'"
One of the earliest compensation cases growing out of a conflict
between opposing unions concerned a work force whose members were
split between AFL and CIO affiliates.'" When the workers associated
with the AFL struck the company because they refused to work along-
side the members of the CIO, the latter group, idled by the strike,
filed for unemployment compensation. The Washington Supreme Court
rejected the contention that the dispute was not one between workers
and an employer and concluded that "there can be no question but
that a labor dispute existed.'"° In another instance, the same court
held that there was a disqualifying labor dispute in a jurisdictional
controversy between two foremen's unions, despite the argument that
foremen are a part of management within the meaning of the NLRA."'
The longshoremen who refused to cross the picket line were therefore
106 Id. at 320-21, 31 A.2d at 742.
108 Duquesne Brewing Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 359
Pa. 535, 59 A.2d 913 (1948).
107 Westinghouse Elec Corp. v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 165
Pa. Super. 385, 390 n.1, 68 A.2d 393, 395 n.1 (1949).
108 Id. at 391, 68 A.2d at 396.
100 In the Matter of Deep River Timber Co., 8 Wash. 2d 179, 111 P.2d 575 (1941).
110 Id. at 184, 111 P.2d at 577.
111 Ackerlund v. Employment Security Dep't, 49 Wash. 2d 292, 300 P.2d 1019 (1956).
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denied benefits. A contrary result was reached in a West Virginia
situation in which the claimants were not members of the picketing
union;"2 as between the picketers and the employer, however, a sub-
sequent case in that state implied that a labor dispute did exist 113
In a difficult Alabama case, a mining company employed members
of two different unions together with men who belonged to no union.'
The company shut down all operations to avoid violence while engaged
in a dispute with one of the unions. The majority opinion sustained
a judgment awarding benefits to a claimant who was a member of the
other union. In accordance with the wording of the Alabama statute,
the court held that the unemployment was not directly due to a labor
dispute. Because of this, the case did not dispose of the more basic
question of whether there was a labor dispute. Indeed, the decision
was held inapplicable in a later rival union case."
V. WILDCAT STRIKES
Just as workers involved in jurisdictional contests and rival union
disputes have argued that they were not involved in a labor dispute,
employees out of work due to wildcat strikes or unauthorized work
stoppages have similarly sought to avoid disqualification. This theory
usually maintains that the strike or stoppage is directed at an employer
who has an existing collective bargaining contract with the union, and
that the union has neither authorized nor ratified the conduct which
precipitated the unemployment for which benefits are being claimed.
Thus, it is asserted, the labor organization is not a party to the con-
troversy and such a controversy is not within the meaning of the term
"labor dispute."
The treatment given this line of argument is exemplified by the
Connecticut case of Bartlett v. Administrator.'" When buffers and
polishers in one department of a plant walked off of their jobs to protest
the introduction of new pay rates, workers in other departments were
laid off due to the interruption in the sequence of plant operations. All
employees involved were represented by the same local union. Since
the walkout was neither authorized nor ratified by the union, and
was in fact a violation of the no-strike clause contained in the labor
agreement, the claimants pleaded that the controversy did not con-
stitute a labor dispute to which they were a party. The Court of Errors
answered this plea by declaring that
112 Board of Review v. flux, 126 W. Va. 538, 29 S.E.2d 618 (1944).
113 Davis v. Ruthbell Coal Co., 133 W. Va. 319, 56 S.E.2d 549 (1949).
114 Department of Industrial Relations v. Drummond, 30 'Ala. App. 78, 1 So. 2d
395 (1941).
115 Badgett v. Department of Industrial Relations, 30 Ala. App. 457, 10 So. 2d 872
(1942).
116 142 Conn. 497, 115 A.2d 671 (1955).
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there is no provision in our statutes to the effect that a labor
dispute cannot exist unless the actions of employees are
authorized, legal and in accordance with the collective bar-
gaining agreement. Neither is there any requirement that the
union be a party to the dispute.... The union was the exclu-
sive bargaining agency. The employer could not negotiate
independently with either the plaintiffs or the employees who
participated in the work stoppages."'
Earlier, an Illinois Supreme Court decision had applied the broad
definitional approach of "any controversy concerning wages, hours,
working conditions or terms of employment" to a wildcat strike situa-
tion."8 The employer and the union representing all production workers
had agreed upon a trial period plan respecting the repair or correction
of imperfectly manufactured items. Employees in the Lasting Depart-
ment refused to work under the new conditions and left their jobs in
protest. This forced the employer to shut down operations, in spite
of the union's efforts to keep the objecting workers at their jobs. When
workers filed unemployment compensation claims as a result of the
shutdown, the circuit court reversed the Director of Labor and allowed
the claims. The state's highest court reinstated the opinion of the
Director of Labor, noting that
the employer in the instant case could not negotiate directly
with the eighteen lasters. Their agency for that purpose was
the same agency which represented all other workers. The
dispute was indivisible; it was one single controversy."'
Under similar circumstances, the South Carolina Supreme Court found
a labor dispute when employees stayed away from work to protest
implementation of a plan approved by a majority of the union."'
VI. LOCKOUTS
There is convincing authority for the proposition that a lockout
is a "labor dispute" for the purposes of unemployment compensation
proceedings."' Although the term "lockout" is absent from the large
majority of labor dispute disqualification provisions, it is present in
the federally required clause relating to conditions for "non-suitability"
117 Id. at 504, 115 A.2d at 675.
118 Local 658, Boot & Shoe Workers v. Brown Shoe Co., 403 III. 484, 87 N.E.2d
625 (1949).
119 Id. at 489-90, 87 N.E.2d at 629.
120 Johnson v. Pratt, 200 S.C. 315, 20 S.E.2d 865 (1942). See Bankston Creek
Collieries, Inc. v. Gordon, 399 Ill. 291, 77 N.E.2d 670 (1948); Milne Chair Co. v. Hake,
supra note 86.
121 Schoenwiesner v. Board of Review, 44 N.J. Super. 377, 130 A.2d 648 (1957), and
cases deed therein.
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of work. 122 However, nowhere is the word defined in terms of unem-
ployment insurance laws. Just as courts have taken judicial notice of
the definition of "strike" which appears in federal decisional law,'"
so have they recognized such a definition of "lockout." One such
definition states:
A strike is a cessation of work by employees in an effort to
get for the employees more desirable terms. A lockout is a
cessation of the furnishing of work to employees in an effort
to get for the employer more desirable terms.'"
In those jurisdictions where the legislatures have elected to adopt
an "employer-fault" theory, a lockout is not a labor dispute for unem-
ployment compensation purposes. Eleven states expressly relieve lock-
outs, wholly or partially, from having the effect of disqualification
which they might otherwise have.'" In two other states, the phrasing
of the labor dispute disqualification clause has been interpreted so as
to exclude lockouts from the labor dispute concept.'"
Among the remaining thirty-seven states, it appears that benefits
will be denied if unemployment is due to a lockout or to a lockout-
caused stoppage of work. Given the rather comprehensive construction
of the term "labor dispute," and the maxim that the payment of bene-
fits is not dependent upon the merits of the controversy,'" it is not
surprising that the courts have included "lockout" within the scope
of that term.'" Moreover, the obligatory federal standards clause in
every state employment security law provides that no work shall be
deemed "suitable" in which "the position offered is vacant, due directly
to strike, lockout, or other labor dispute.' (Emphasis added.) The
last, the generic term, subsumes under it the concept of lockout.
The landmark case of In the Matter of North River Logging
Co."° developed a detailed rationale which has proven definitive. In
that case, the Washington Supreme Court recognized the lockout as
122 Federal Unemployment Insurance Tax Act, 68A Stat. 445 (1954), as amended,
26 U.S.C. 	 3304(a) (5) (1964).
123 See, e.g., Sandoval v. Industrial Comm'n, 110 Colo. 108, 130 P.2d 930 (1942).
124 Iron Molders' Union No. 125 v. Allis-Chalmers Co., 166 Fed. 45, 52 (7th Cir.
1908), cited, e.g., in In the Matter of North River Logging Co., 15 Wash. 2d 204, 208,
130 P.2d 64, 66 (1942).
125 These states are Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Kentucky, Michigan, Min-
nesota, Mississippi, New Hampshire, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia.
126 Gardner v. Director of Employment, 53 Cal. 2d 23, 346 P.2d 193 (1959); Local
Nos. 222 & 976, Teamsters Union v. Board of Review, 10 Utah 2d 63, 348 P.2d 558 (1960).
127 See Lawrence Baking Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Comm'n, 308 Mich.
198, 13 N.W.2d 260, cert. denied, 323 U.S. 738 (1944).
128 Schoenwiesner v. Board of Review, supra note 121.
726 Federal Unemployment Insurance Tax Act, 68A Stat. 445 (1954), as amended, 26
U.S.C. 	 3304(a)(5) (1964).
no Supra note 124.
50
CONCEPT OF "LABOR DISPUTE"
"a counterpart to the weapon of strike held by the workers."' The
court turned to British decisions under earlier insurance laws, a tool
of judicial construction previously used only to interpret the concept
of "stoppage of work.""2 The holdings in those early cases uniformly
agreed that a lockout was a "trade dispute" within the contemplation
of the English national insurance acts. Another factor which the
Washington court considered was that in some of the state unemploy-
ment compensation laws there were phrases removing or qualifying
a lockout as a basis for disqualification from benefits. Language which
exempted lockouts from the disqualification provision amounted to a
legislative acknowledgement that the lockout was a form of labor
dispute.
In recent years, the development of so-called "whipsaw" tactics
by labor organizations confronting multi-employer bargaining groups
has given rise to a number of lockout cases. When all members of a
restaurant association, reacting to such tactics, temporarily closed
down their establishments in response to a strike called by a union
against one member of the association, the Illinois Supreme Court
found "no distinction in principle between a lockout and a strike." 1a3
The Supreme Court of Oregon construed "labor dispute" similarly when
members of a multi-state employers' association ceased operations in
accordance with their declared policy that "a strike against one is a
strike against all."'" More recently, the suspension of the New Fork
Herald Tribune and The Mirror, inter alia, as a retaliatory measure
under a mutual assistance pact, led a New Jersey court to declare that
"it is now well established law in the State that lockouts as well as
strikes are two of the forms by which a 'labor dispute' may be mani-
fested, and that, in either event, the State occupies a completely neutral
position. . ."" 5
Except in those jurisdictions which expressly or impliedly allow
claimants to draw benefits when their unemployment is due to a lock-
out or a lockout-caused stoppage of work, it must be concluded that
"it is immaterial whether . . . unemployment was caused by a 'strike'
or a 'lockout' for the reason that in either event it is crystal clear that
such unemployment was the direct and immediate result of the 'con-
troversy concerning terms and conditions of employment'. . . ."136 For
example, where idleness was due in part to a lockout and in part to
lack of work, but both could be traced to a strike, a disqualifying labor
131 Id. at 208, 130 P.2d at 66.
132 See Magner v. Kinney, 141 Neb. 122, 128, 2 N.W.2d 689, 692 (1942).
133 Buchholz v. Cummins, 6 III. 2d 382, 388, 128 N.E.2d 900, 903 (1955).
194 Helliei v. Cameron, 228 Ore. 452, 365 P.2d 498 (1961).
136 Basso v. News Syndicate Co., 90 N.J. Super. 150, 169, 216 A.2d 597, 607 (1966).
136 Adkins v. Employment Security Div., 117 Ind. App. 132, 142, 70 N.E.2d 31, 35
(1946).
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dispute existed.'" However, it must be noted that "not every shut-down
or plant closing by an employer is a lockout within the meaning of
the statute, or in the sense of being one of the economic weapons in
the arsenal of combatants in a labor dispute."I88 Where a statute pro-
vides that unemployment is not compensable if caused by a "strike
or other bona fide labor dispute," 139 "there may be situations in which
a lockout would not qualify as a bona fide labor dispute, even though
it did not constitute a breach of contract on the part of the em-
ployer.'"
It must be remembered, however, that in the overwhelming
majority of jurisdictions a court cannot attempt to fix or weigh an
employer's responsibility or fault (nor, indeed, employee responsibility
or fault) in the determination of whether a labor dispute exists. One
rare attempt to distinguish bona fide from mala fide disputes in order
to achieve a particular result in a disqualification appea1 141 was criti-
cized as inappropriate by that state's highest court in a differentcase. 142
VII. DISQUALIFICATION BEYOND TERMINATION OF THE DISPUTE
Since Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corp. v. Review Bd.,' it has become
well settled in stoppage-of-work jurisdictions that a labor dispute dis-
qualification continues after termination of the dispute for whatever
period of unemployment is necessary to resume normal plant opera-
tions. No such condition obtains in the other jurisdictions except for
statutory provisions such as Ohio's (". . . and for so long as his
unemployment is due to such labor dispute."). 144 In construing an
earlier version of the same statute ("... and for so long as such dispute
continues."), the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that employees were not
entitled to unemployment compensation during the period beginning
with the termination of the strike and ending when the employer had
reactivated its steel plant by what was necessarily a gradual process. 145
A "labor dispute" is broader than a strike. It includes a controversy
over wages, working conditions, or terms of employment. Although
the strike in the Ohio case was terminated by- a federal injunction issued
under the national emergency provisions of the Labor Management
Depaoli v. Ernst, 73 Nev. 79, 309 P.2d 363 (1957).
138 Buchholz v. Cummins, supra note 133, at 388, 128 N.E.2d at 903.
Ise E.g., Wis. Stat. Ann. § 108.04(10) ( 1 957).
140 A. J. Sweet, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 16 Wis. 2d 98, 110b, 114 N.W.2d 141,
854 (1962).
141 Department of Industrial Relations v. Stone, 36 Ala. App. 16, 53 So. 2d 859
(1951).
142 T. R. Miller Mill Co. v. Johns, 261 Ala. 615, 617, 75 So. 2d 675, 677 (1954).
'43 117 Ind. App. 379, 72 N.E.2d 662 (1947).
111 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4141.29(0)(1)(a) (Baldwin 1964).
145 Leach V. Republic Steel Corp., 176 Ohio St. 221, 199 N.E.2d 3 (1964).
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Relations Act of 1947," the controversy continued until mutual agree-
ment was entered into some two months later. Similarly, in New York,
a plant seizure by the Secretary of Commerce, pursuant to a Presiden-
tial Executive Order, did not terminate the "industrial controversy,"
even though it did avert the strike. 147 As a result of shutdown arrange-
ments, the claimants could not return to work until the mill had re-
sumed operations. The consequent unemployment was held to be
directly caused by the underlying controversy which did not cease
until a collective settlement was subsequently reached. More recently,
another New York case rejected an argument that claimants were out
of work because of a strike which had not "terminated" until full pro-
duction was restored."8 The court stated that "the lack of work
occasioned by the necessity for gradual resumption of production is
merely an incident of the particular industry which is outside the pur-
view of the statute and over which neither side has any control.'
Thus New York has refused to attribute a "vicarious voluntariness to
the post-settlement unemployment."'
VIII CONCLUSIONS
"Labor dispute" as a threshold concept in unemployment com-
pensation proceedings has come to include virtually any controversy
affecting the terms and conditions of the employment situation, regard-
less of whether the disputants stand in an employer-employee relation-
ship. The restrictive construction of "labor dispute" has not received
judicial acceptance. General usage derived from dictionary meanings,
definitional provisions in federal and state labor relations and anti-
injunction acts, authors and commentators, British antecedent inter-
pretations—all have generally revealed a propensity to broaden the
scope of the concept. This trend, supported by the highest court in
the land," has been followed in labor dispute disqualification clauses
even when terms other than "labor dispute" appear. "Trade dispute,"
"industrial controversy," "industrial dispute," and "strike" have all
received similar treatment. Not yet adequately tested are strikes or
lockouts engaged in for purposes which conflict with public policy
or which exceed the historic demands of labor or management. Such
controversies might develop over the introduction of new technology,
146 61 Stat. 155 (1947), as amended, 29 US.C. f 178 (1964).
147 In the Matter of Vingoe, 285 App. Div. 160, 136 N YS 2d 893 (1954).
148 Acquisto v. General Motors Corp., 269 N.YS.2d 567 (App. Div. 1966).
149 Id. at 570.
199 Claim of George, 14 N.Y.2d 234, 239, 199 N.E.2d 503, 505, 250 N.Y.S.2d 421,
424 (1964). A labor-dispute-in-active-progress state would have no hesitation about
allowing benefits for the period after resolution of the dispute but before resumption of
operations. See Davis v. Aluminum Co. of America, 204 Tenn. 135, 316 S.W.2d 24 (1958).
151 Unemployment Compensation Comm'n v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143 (1946).
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over so-called "management prerogative," or over racial job distribu-
tion and preferential hiring. As labor disputes arise out of new issues
in the future, the absence of a static definition permits better applica-
tion of the concept to the dynamics of industrial conflict.
The effect of the broad construction of "labor dispute" has been,
of course, to provide a greater opportunity for employers to success-
fully oppose the granting of benefits. Conversely, the opportunity of
the unemployed laborer to establish entitlement to compensation has
been lessened. A more restrictive interpretation of "labor dispute,"
however, might produce undesirable results. For example, since an
unemployed worker receiving compensation may endanger his pay-
ments by refusing a position unless the vacancy was due to a labor
dispute,' a narrow construction might force him to interfere in a labor
controversy by taking a job vacated by other than a technical "labor
dispute." In addition, restricting the interpretation of "labor dispute"
under anti-injunction legislation correspondingly lessens the protection
afforded to labor organizations from the imposition of such powerful
employer remedies. It is therefore submitted that only a flexible con-
struction of the phrase "labor dispute" will be adequate to encompass
the innumerable and complex situations of modern labor law.
162 See, e.g., Federal Unemployment Tax Act, 68A Stat. 445 (1954), as amended,
26 U.S.C. 	 3304(a)(5) (1964), which reads:
[Clompensation shall not be denied . . . to any otherwise eligible individual
for refusing to accept new work under any of the following conditions:
(A) If the position offered is vacant due directly to a strike, lockout, or
other labor dispute....
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